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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
\

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

\:

V.

1

THOMAS M. BECKSTEAD-PORTER,

\\

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890309-CA

Category No. 2

\

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of Aggravated Arson, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103
(Supp. 1989), and Insurance Fraud, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-521 (1978).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at

trial to support the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of
aggravated arson and insurance fraud?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Thomas Beckstead-Porter, appeals from a
judgment and conviction of Aggravated Arson, a first degree
felony, and Insurance Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-103 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-521 (1978),
respectively (R. 134-36).

Defendant was convicted after a jury

trial on August 5, 1988, in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A.
Rokich, Judge, presiding. Id.

Judge Rokich suspended defendant's

prison sentence and placed him on probation for a period of
eighteen (18) months and ordered him to serve thirty (30) days in
jail. £d.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of November 1, 1987, a fire broke out in
the basement of defendant's home in Salt Lake County (T. 123,
138).

A neighbor called "911" at 10:31 p.m. (T. 269). The fire

department arrived at approximately 10:38, had the fire under
control by 10:44, and had the fire out by 10:52 (T. 271). The
fire inspectors determined that the fire had burned approximately
15 minutes (T. 195). At the time of the fire, defendant was the
only person present in the house (T. 500). Defendant's wife was
in Phoenix, Arizona (T. 546).
The fire originated in a laundry room in defendant's
basement (T. 155-56, 265). The room sustained heavy damage and
had been subjected to a so called "flashover" (T. 266). A
flashover occurs when everything in a room burns (T. 251, 266).
The investigation revealed that the flashover occurred before the
firefighters arrived (T. 272).
When the fire department arrived, one firefighter
observed an iron in the laundry room in an upright position (T.
143, T. 150, 153). Andrew Glad, Assistant Fire Chief of the
Sandy Fire Department, removed the iron from the laundry room
because he thought it might have been involved with the fire (T.

156).

No other immediate cause of the fire was observed (T.

156).

Glad discovered the iron on the floor but observed that

the ironing board had been moved on the night of the fire (T.
159, 162). The iron was still plugged into the electrical outlet
(T. 168). Glad delivered the iron to Captain Dave Meldrum of the
Sandy Fire Department (T. 156).
Captain Meldrum investigated the fire scene on November
4th (T. 240). In his investigation, he found no fire hazards
outside the home (T. 244). Meldrum observed two broken windows
to the basement of defendant's house,

jki. He determined that

both windows were broken either during the fire or shortly
afterward based on the smoke stains on the glass (T. 247). At
the time the firemen arrived, the basement door was locked with
no signs of forced entry (T. 265).
In the laundry room, Meldrum observed burning which
extended from the floor and across the ceiling (T. 272). Melted
plastic on the ironing board indicated the heat from the fire
came from above the ironing board (T. 273). Additionally, the
rust patterns on the ironing board indicated that the top of the
board received the most heat, while the plastic caps on the
bottom of the ironing board did not completely melt, indicating
minimal heat (T. 274).
Near this location, Meldrum discovered some strips of
burned material, evidently part of a Halloween mummy costume made
of bed sheets which defendant used few days previously (T. 165,
198, 267). Subsequently, the National Fire Academy in
Washington, D.C., informed Meldrum that bed sheets ignite at a
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temperature of 525 to 560 degrees (T. 275, 280). The plastic
caps on the feet of the ironing board had an ignition temperature
of 200 degrees, the lowest of any item in the laundry room (T.
290).

Other burned materials in the room had much higher

ignition points; for example, the wood had an ignition
temperature of 800 degrees and the aluminum wiring 1210 degrees
(T. 290-91).
At trial, Meldrum testified that fires could be ignited
in three ways:

acts of providence, accidents, or intentionally

(T. 280). He discussed each possibility in turn.

He defined a

providential fire as one caused by "catastrophe, lightning,
earthquakes, that sort of thing." (T. 281). He went on to say
that "[s]ince we had no lightning strikes, no earthquakes,
nothing else that would indicate a providential fire, we rules
[sic] that out immediately." Id.
Meldrum also eliminated an accidental cause of fire.
He excluded an electrical fire since no electrical source existed
in the area of the fire origin (T. 281). He ruled out
spontaneous ignition, accelerants, children playing with matches,
cigarettes, natural gas leaks, and a malfunctioning water heater
or furnace (T. 291-92).
He also determined the iron was not the source of the
fire.

He based his conclusion on several factors including the

statements of an eyewitness that the iron was upright on the
ironing board when the firefighters entered the room (T. 143,
150, 153, 282-84).

Additionally, defendant told Meldrum that he

had been in the room only a few minutes before the fire (T. 282).
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Meldrum testified that an iron fire takes considerable time to
ignite and produces a great deal of smoke which defendant would
have noticed (T. 282). He further explained that an iron will
start a fire only if it meets certain conditions (T. 282).
First, the iron must be encapsulated in flammable material with
no air flow (T. 283). He considered encapsulation unlikely in
this instance because insufficient material existed to
encapsulate the iron (T. 283).
As part of his investigation, Meldrum bought an iron
identical to defendant's iron (T. 224, 284). Setting the
thermostat on the new iron to a point identical to that on
defendant's iron, the maximum temperature attained was 395
degrees (T. 234, 284, 286). The manufacturer confirmed the
maximum temperature setting (T. 289). Meldrum testified that the
iron could not radiate enough heat to travel three to four feet
to melt the caps on the feet of the ironing board (T. 291).
His tests further indicated that the iron was on during
the fire (T. 318). He discovered that the fire caused a short in
the iron, but the short did not cause the fire (T. 287). He
explained that the iron did not indicate the type of damage an
iron fire would cause since an iron fire would be a smoldering,
sooty fire (T. 286, 335, 381, 396).

Based on his investigation

and tests, Meldrum concluded that the fire was intentionally
induced by a lighter or match on the Halloween mummy costume
consisting of bedding material (T. 298).
Concurrently with Meldrum's investigation, James Ashby
independently investigated the fire for defendant's homeowners
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insurance company (T. 173). Ashby also determined that the fire
started in the laundry room (T. 185-86).

Because of the lack of

damage to the face of the iron, Ashby discounted the iron as the
source of the fire (T. 216). He testified that an iron fire
would produce smoke which would in turn cause charring on the
face of the iron (T. 220). He found no charring or black
substance on the face of the iron.

Id.

He opined that the

carpet in the laundry room had burned before the iron fell to the
floor (T. 530-31).

He based his opinion on the fact that only

residue of previously burned carpet appeared on the edge of the
iron.

Id.
Ross Watson, an appliance repairman, testified that the

iron involved in the fire had a safety feature designed to shut
off the iron if the thermostat malfunctioned (T. 227). He also
stated that he had not seen an overheated iron in ten to fifteen
years (T. 228). He said that if the iron had overheated as the
result of a manufacturer's defect, the bottom of the iron would
have melted or bubbled (T. 228, 230).
Coincidently, defendant contacted his insurance agent
just three days before the fire and attempted to change insurance
companies from Farmers to Aetna and increase the coverage on his
home from $64,000 to $70,000 (T. 74, 98-101).

The day after the

fire, defendant again contacted his insurance agent to make a
claim on his new Aetna policy (T. 106). Defendant also filed a
claim on his Farmers policy (T. 70). Two days before the fire,
defendant disconnected the smoke alarm installed in his house (T.
548-49).

Defendant speculates that his dogs knocked over the
iron sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., encapsulating it
in his Halloween costume, and eventually causing the fire about
10:30 p.m. (T. 437, 512-14, 551, 582-83).

He relies on the

testimony of two experts from the State Crime Lab at Weber State
College (T. 442, 465). The first expert, Art Terkelsen,
testified that the melted material on the iron matched the burned
carpeting as well as defendant's Halloween costume (T. 445).
However, he could not determine whether the iron caused the fire
(T.

453-54).

He said that had the iron started the fire, there

would have been scorching around the iron (T. 455-56, 459).
Defendant's second expert witness, Dwayne Moyes,
testified that encapsulation could occur, producing heat in
excess of 525 degrees (T. 471). Moyes encapsulated an iron in
his lab at a temperature of 325 degrees and determined that smoke
was produced only three to five minutes before ignition (T. 47374).

However, on cross-examination, he testified that he only

heated the iron for a half an hour and then terminated the
experiment because he did not want to risk a lab fire (T. 47880).

He explained that he calculated when the iron would have

reached 525 degrees (T. 478-80).

He also testified that the iron

had Ma bit of browning" from his experiment (T. 484).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury had sufficient evidence to convict defendant
of aggravated arson and insurance fraud.

The state called three

expert witnesses to establish that the fire was not accidental,
but intentional.

The state also established that defendant
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attempted to change his insurance company and increase the amount
of his policy only a few days before the fire.

If believed, the

State'8 direct and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to
establish all the elements of the crimes.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict.

However, a review of the evidence reveals that

defendants claim is without merit.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the
standard to be applied by an appellate court is narrow.
[W]e review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury verdict
for insufficient evidence only
when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted.
State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444
(1983); accord State v. McCardle, Utah, 652
P.2d 942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. It is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence
It must be noted that defendant does not directly
challenge the sufficiency of the insurance fraud conviction,
apparently because it is dependent on the aggravated arson
conviction. Simply, defendant's insurance claim of accidental
loss would be fraudulent if he intentionally set the fire.

and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses . . . State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d
229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden,
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can
reasonable be made, our inquiry stops.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
In the instant case, the jury convicted defendant of
the offenses of aggravated arson and insurance fraud, which
provide as follows:
76-6-103. Aggravated Arson.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson
if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfuly damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any
person not a participant in the offense is
in the structure or vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (Supp. 1989).
False or fraudulent insurance claim—Punishment
as for theft.
Every person who presents, or causes to be
presented, any false or fraudulent claim,
or any proof in support of any such claim,
upon any contract of insurance for the
payment of any loss, or who prepares,
makes or subscribes any account,
certificate of survey, affidavit or proof
of loss, or other book, paper or writing,
with intent to present or use the same, or
to allow it to be presented or used, in
support of any such claim is punishable as
in the manner prescribed for theft of
property of like value.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-521 (1978).
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court explained
that in reviewing the sufficiency of an aggravated arson and
insurance fraud conviction, "it is a well-settled rule that

guilt of the accused."
1986).

State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah

-Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior

evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a
jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is
sufficient to sustain a conviction.*1

^d. at 127.

Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury
could infer that on the night of the fire, defendant waited until
his father-in-law and brother-in-law left his house between 8:30
and 9:00 p.m. (T. 550), talked to his wife on the telephone from
approximately 10:12 to 10:20 p.m. (T. 300-01), made sure the iron
was plugged in and turned on (T.

318), and set the basement

laundry room on fire by igniting his Halloween mummy costume (T.
398).

Defendant then went to his neighbor's house and reported

that his house was on fire (T. 121, 489-90).
The laundry room reached flashpoint before 10:38 p.m.,
when the fire department arrived (T. 272). Less than ten minutes
had passed from ignition to flash point (T. 268). Peering
through the window of the laundry room, a fireman observed the
iron sitting upright on the ironing board (T. 142-43).

Sometime

during the salvage and overhaul stage, the iron was knocked from
the ironing board to the floor where it was retrieved by Chief
Glad and given to Captain Meldrum (T. 159, 160, 375).
The State's experts ruled out the iron as the cause of
the fire for several reasons.

First, the iron was in an upright

position on the ironing board when the fire department arrived at
the scene (T. 142-43).

Second, defendant stated that he had been

in the laundry room only minutes before the fire (T. 282).

Meldrum testified that it takes a considerable amount of time to
ignite an iron fire and it would produce a great deal of smoke
prior to ignition (T. 282). Third, an iron must be encapsulated
in flammable material without airflow to obtain sufficient heat
to ignite (T. 283). Meldrum testified that insufficient material
existed in the area to encapsulate the iron.

Ld.

Fourth, the

maximum heat produced from the iron was insufficient to obtain
the ignition temperature of the bed sheet material (T. 234, 275,
280, 284, 286, 289). Fifth, the fire was not ignited by an
electrical short in the iron (T. 287). Sixth, the face of the
iron lacked evidence of charring which would have resulted if the
iron produced the fire (T. 216). Seventh, Ashby concluded that
the carpet on the laundry room floor had burned prior to the iron
falling to the floor (T. 530-31).

Finally, Watson stated that

the iron lacked melting or-bubbling which would have occurred had
the iron overheated (T. 228, 230).
Based upon the evidence, it could be reasonably
inferred that: (1) defendant was the only person in the house at
the time of the fire, and (2) the fire was not accidental but was
intentionally set by human hands. While motive is not an element
of the crime, the insurance proceeds provided a compelling reason
for defendant to ignite his house on fire. Viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the verdict, a jury could have
reasonably concluded that defendant intentionally ignited his
house on fire to collect the insurance money.
Defendant appears to further argue that the evidence
was insufficient because some evidence, if believed, tends to

show that defendant did not commit the offense.

In making this

argument, defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant's theory of a crime is
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the
credibility of the witnesses' testimony.

State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d

229 (Utah 1980); Efco Distrib., Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375,
412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966); Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 9
Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959).

The basic function of the

jury is to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions
from it.

State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986).

Merely

weighing the number of witnesses is never dispositive.

State v.

Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1988), on reconsideration 776
P.2d 631 (Utah 1989).

Despite testimony to the contrary, the

jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant
committed the offenses of which he was convicted.

State v.

Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
DATED this <^%9*—day of October, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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